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Abstract 
With the “Vision 2030” development plan, Saudi Arabia wants to diversify 
its economy and end its dependence on oil in the long term. The Public 
Investment Fund (PIF) is of particular importance here. By 2030, it is to 
become the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund (SWF) and manage finan-
cial assets worth $2 trillion. The PIF is not designed as a savings fund, but 
as a stabilisation and development fund: The fund capital is intended to 
cushion the state budget against price fluctuations on the commodities 
market, finance development projects, and attract investments and know-
how from abroad to the kingdom. 
The analysis shows, however, that the expansion of the PIF is primarily 
motivated by power politics. The SWF gives Crown Prince Muhammad Bin 
Salman direct access to the state’s substantial financial resources. He can use 
these resources according to his preferences and thus purchase the loyalty of 
politically important factions within the elite. In addition, Bin Salman could 
use the PIF to “buy” international support for his political goals. Through the 
SWF, the economic transformation in Saudi Arabia is closely linked to the 
consolidation of the crown prince’s rule. Decision-makers in Germany and 
Europe should be aware of these functions of the PIF. Economic cooperation 
with the kingdom involving the PIF or companies controlled by it has a po-
litical dimension that must not be ignored. In addition, a stronger involve-
ment of the PIF in Europe could require a political impact assessment that 
would have to examine whether the SWF primarily acts as a profit-seeking 
investor or whether it is pursuing a foreign policy agenda. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
A Sovereign Wealth Fund for the Prince. 
Economic Reforms and Power Consolida-
tion in Saudi Arabia 
On 25 April 2016, then-Deputy Crown Prince 
Muhammad Bin Salman announced the outlines 
of a gigantic development plan: With “Vision 2030”, 
Saudi Arabia wants to diversify its economy and 
increase its competitiveness. By boosting the private 
sector, building futuristic cities, and tapping new 
natural resources, Saudi Arabia aims to end its de-
pendence on oil. A central project of Vision 2030 is 
the establishment of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF). 
The kingdom is thus following the model of three 
neighbouring Gulf states – Qatar, Kuwait, and the 
United Arab Emirates – which have been pouring 
surplus oil revenues into SWFs for years. The plan is 
to expand the Public Investment Fund (PIF), a hitherto 
rather unknown public development fund, into the 
largest SWF in the world within a very short period 
of time. In fact, the fund’s assets have been more 
than doubled since 2016 to well over $300 billion 
through public financial transfers, more than 15 per 
cent of which is invested abroad. By transferring 
ownership of the state-owned oil company, Saudi 
Aramco, the PIF is also to gain a share of the 
kingdom’s oil revenues in the future. 
This study examines the political motivation 
behind the expansion of the PIF. This question is all 
the more important since the Saudi government 
stated before 2015 that the establishment of an SWF 
would not be economically necessary. Now it explic-
itly cites economic reasons for the configuration and 
expansion of the PIF. According to its announce-
ments, the PIF is to serve both as a stabilisation fund 
and as a development fund. It is intended to diver-
sify government revenues, open up new economic 
sectors – especially for the private sector – and 
channel foreign direct investment (FDI) to Saudi 
Arabia, also to facilitate knowledge and technology 
transfer to the kingdom. The analysis shows, how-
ever, that the government’s approach is hardly suited 
to achieving these goals. This is evident through the 
lack of transparency, especially with regard to the 
integration of the PIF into government fiscal policy, 
and an investment behaviour of the SWF that im-
Issues and Recommendations 
SWP Berlin 
A Sovereign Wealth Fund for the Prince 
July 2019 
6 
pedes rather than promotes sustainable private-sector 
development. 
The far greater effect will be that the expansion 
will give the PIF access to a substantial part of the 
country’s public finances and ensure economic su-
premacy in the country’s business sector. It is also 
driving forward the concentration of the kingdom’s 
foreign investment and procurement activities under 
its umbrella, particularly in the area of important 
defence procurement. As the fund is institutionally 
tailored to Muhammad Bin Salman, the PIF will con-
tribute to a centralisation of power in favour of the 
crown prince, in line with the findings of recent SWF 
research. According to these studies, SWFs are an 
important instrument for securing power in authori-
tarian political contexts. In the Saudi case, the PIF can 
be used by the crown prince to align the country’s 
segmented patronage system to his person. Through 
direct investments and public contracts, Bin Salman 
can also try to “buy” the support of relevant foreign 
governments for his political goals. 
In the context of Vision 2030, the SWF will thus 
serve less as a “growth engine”, as described by the 
state leadership, than as the crown prince’s central 
steering instrument to counter any loss of political 
control. Should Vision 2030 fail altogether and the 
announced development boost for the kingdom fail 
to materialise, Bin Salman would also have a resource 
at his disposal that would enable him to purchase the 
loyalty of important groups, such as in the security 
apparatus, through targeted transfer payments, de-
spite the austerity policy that would then be neces-
sary. However, the expansion of the PIF is far from 
complete. Bin Salman’s aggressive foreign policy and 
the murder of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi in 
Istanbul in October 2018 have severely damaged 
Saudi Arabia’s image and that of the Saudi SWF, 
especially in Europe and the United States. In addi-
tion, the surprising postponement of Saudi Aramco’s 
initial public offering (IPO) in June 2018 and the delay 
in the transfer of Saudi Aramco’s ownership rights 
to the PIF indicate that there is resistance within the 
kingdom to the fund’s rise. From today’s point of 
view, however, opposition hardly seems strong 
enough to stop the government’s actions. 
For German and European policy-makers, the 
expansion of the PIF is a challenge in two respects. 
On the one hand, the plan to make the SWF the most 
important steering instrument of the Saudi economy 
makes it clear that even a supposedly non-political 
cooperation between Germany and its European part-
ners and the kingdom, for example in the implemen-
tation of Vision 2030, will have clear political impli-
cations. The PIF will closely link economic transfor-
mation in Saudi Arabia with the consolidation of Bin 
Salman’s rule. On the other hand, the SWF could also 
invest more in Europe in the future. European gov-
ernments would then have to deal with the question 
of how to handle a state investor who is not primarily 
return-oriented, but who might also represent the 
foreign policy interests of his government – similar 
to other SWFs, such as those of China and Russia. 
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At the beginning of 2015, there was a change of 
leadership in Saudi Arabia. After the death of King 
Abdullah, who had ruled the country for 10 years, his 
younger brother Salman ascended the throne. King 
Salman promoted his then 29-year-old son, Muham-
mad Bin Salman, to central positions of power. He 
first appointed him minister of defence, then deputy 
crown prince in April 2015, and crown prince in June 
2017. Bin Salman thus effectively took over the 
leadership of the country in all areas. He used all his 
force against potential and actual political opponents. 
Competitors within the royal family were placed 
under house arrest, and critics outside the royal 
family were imprisoned or, as in the case of Saudi 
dissident Jamal Khashoggi, killed. The domestic 
political takeover was flanked by a new trend towards 
an aggressive Saudi foreign policy, which has been 
particularly striking in the Saudi military interven-
tion in Yemen (since March 2015) and the blockade 
of the Emirate of Qatar (since June 2017).1 
However, the young crown prince was initially 
noticed internationally not because of his harsh 
actions against competitors and critics or his foreign 
policy, but because of his economic and socio-politi-
cal reform agenda, which he presented to the gen-
eral public at the beginning of 2016 under the title 
“Vision 2030”.2 In his capacity as chairman of the 
newly created “Economic Cabinet”, the Council of 
Economic and Development Affairs (CEDA), he an-
nounced on 25 April 2016 a gigantic programme for 
the renewal and modernisation of the Saudi economy 
and society, the main features of which are based on 
 
1 See also Guido Steinberg, Muhammad Bin Salman Al Saud 
an der Macht. Der Kronprinz und die saudi-arabische Außenpolitik 
seit 2015, SWP-Aktuell 71/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, December 2018). 
2 See Vision 2030 – Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, April 2016, 
https://vision2030.gov.sa/sites/default/files/report/Saudi_ 
Vision2030_EN_2017.pdf (accessed 4 February 2019). 
a study by the consulting firm McKinsey.3 The aim of 
Vision 2030 is to diversify the economy and thus end 
the country’s long-term dependence on oil revenues. 
This dependence had had an increasingly negative 
impact on public finances in previous years. Since 
the 1970s, the share of revenues from oil sales in total 
government revenue has averaged well over 80 per 
cent, and even over 90 per cent between 2010 and 
2014.4 The collapse of international oil prices in 2014 
had therefore led to a dramatic budget deficit, aver-
aging well over 10 per cent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2017. At its highest level in 2016, the state 
was lacking nearly $100 billion.5 For the reign of King 
Salman, who was already 79 years old at the time of 
his accession to the throne, this does not represent 
an acute threat. The kingdom does not have a high 
foreign debt and has considerable financial reserves, 
which it has earned over the years with rising oil 
prices (1973 to 1982 and 2003 to 2014).6 The Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) alone managed 
foreign exchange reserves worth $609 billion at the 
end of 2015.7 Even high budget deficits could be 
 
3 McKinsey Global Institute, Saudi Arabia beyond Oil: The In-
vestment and Productivity Transformation (New York, December 
2015), https://mck.co/2QfRI6M (accessed 4 February 2019). 
4 See Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), ed., Yearly 
Statistics, http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/EconomicReports/ 
Pages/YearlyStatistics.aspx (accessed 4 February 2019). 
5 Angus McDowall and Andrew Torchia, “Saudi Plans 
Spending Cuts, Reforms to Shrink Budget Deficit”, Reuters, 
28 December 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-
budget-idUSKBN0UB10D20151228 (accessed 5 February 2019). 
6 See Daniel Moshashai, Andrew M. Leber and James D. 
Savage, “Saudi Arabia Plans for Its Economic Future: Vision 
2030, the National Transformation Plan and Saudi Fiscal 
Reform”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (online), 20 
August 2018, 5ff., https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/ 
10.1080/13530194.2018.1500269 (accessed 5 February 2019). 
7 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ed., Saudi Arabia: 2018 
Article IV Consultation – Press Release and Staff Report, IMF Coun-
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financed over years. For Salman’s probable successor, 
Crown Prince Muhammad, recent socio-economic 
developments pose a serious political challenge: The 
continuing high population growth of 2 per cent 
(2017),8 coupled with rising unemployment, especial-
ly among young people (38.8 per cent in the 20 to 24 
age group9), and a possible decline in global demand 
for oil as a result of technological change could lead 
to a dramatic worsening of the situation of public 
finances in the coming decades.10 In the long run, 
budget deficits, such as in the period between 2015 
and 2017, would no longer be offset by reserves and 
the raising of further public debt. Then the kingdom’s 
political leadership would come under considerable 
pressure. 
“Vision 2030” aims to make public 
finances and living standards 
independent of oil export revenues. 
The implementation of Vision 2030 is therefore 
intended to boost the growth of the Saudi economy 
(motto: “A Thriving Economy”), but above all to diver-
sify it so that in the future, public finances, the living 
standard of the population, and the development of 
the private sector will no longer depend on oil export 
revenues.11 The share of the private sector in GDP is 
to rise from 40 to 65 per cent, that of FDI from 3.8 to 
5.7 per cent of GDP, and that of non-oil exports from 
16 to 50 per cent of total exports. At the same time, 
the unemployment rate is expected to fall from 11.6 
to 7 per cent. This economic transformation is to be 
embedded in social reforms (“A Vibrant Society”) and 
a reorganisation of state structures (“An Ambitious 
Nation”). The aim is to increase the proportion of 
women in total employment and improve the effec-
tiveness and transparency of state administration. 
 
try Report no. 18/263 (Washington, D.C., 24 August 2018), 
71, http://bit.ly/2VRmDaY (accessed 5 February 2019). 
8 The World Bank, ed., World Development Indicators – 
Population Growth, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
SP.POP.GROW (accessed 5 February 2019). 
9 See General Authority for Statistics, Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Labour Force Survey, Labour Market 2018 Third Quarter, 
https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/818-0. Total unemployment in 
the 3rd quarter of 2018 amounted to 12.8 per cent. 
10 Other factors that could have a negative impact on 
public finances include climate change and local political 
unrest. 
11 See Moshashai et al., “Saudi Arabia Plans for Its Eco-
nomic Future” (see note 6), 9. 
Crown Prince Bin Salman has put all his political 
capital into the reform programme. Vision 2030 is 
“his” vision and is linked to his person. Accordingly, 
the implementation of the agenda is also his respon-
sibility. For this reason, the relevant decision-making 
processes have been centralised and tailored to the 
crown prince. By merging old and creating new state 
institutions, existing bureaucratic hurdles are to be 
overcome and implementation procedures made 
more efficient.12 The reforms announced in Vision 
2030 were also concretised in “Vision Realisation” 
programmes – above all the National Transforma-
tion Program – which, in turn, are to be realised 
within the framework of initiatives by various state 
institutions.13 Vision 2030 is also to be continuously 
reviewed and adapted. It can also be supplemented 
with new projects. One example of this is the con-
struction of Neom, a high-tech city on the Red Sea 
costing $500 billion, which was announced in 2017.14 
Vision 2030 differs in several respects from pre-
vious, mostly less successful reform agendas of the 
Saudi government.15 On the one hand, the assessment 
on which the programme is based is comparatively 
ruthless and radical. In public statements, Bin Salman 
and other decision-makers, for example, denounced 
Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil as dangerous for 
the country.16 On the other hand, Vision 2030 envis-
ages socio-political liberalisation steps that for a long 
time seemed unthinkable in Saudi Arabia. The eco-
 
12 The Decision Support Center, which was established 
directly at the royal court and prepares decisions for the 
crown prince, deserves special mention here. 
13 For the implementation process, see KSA Vision 2030 – 
Strategic Objectives and Vision Realization Programs, 25 April 
2016, https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/download/file/fid/1319 
(accessed 5 February 2019). 
14 Alaa Shahine, Glen Carey and Vivian Nereim, “Saudi 
Arabia Just Announced Plans to Build a Mega City That 
Will Cost $500 Billion”, Bloomberg, 24 October 2017, https:// 
bloom.bg/2JHb2cF; see also Adel Abdel Ghafar, “A New 
Kingdom of Saud?”, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs 28 (2018): 
72–81 (79ff.), https://cdn.thecairoreview.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/02/cr28-ghafar.pdf (both accessed 9 May 2019). 
15 See also Jane Kinninmont, Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s 
Social Contract: Austerity and Transformation (London: Chatham 
House, July 2017), 10, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/research/2017-07-20-vision-2030-
saudi-kinninmont.pdf (accessed 5 February 2019). 
16 See Hazel Sheffield, “Saudi Arabia Sets out Sweeping 
Reforms to Wean Itself off ‘Dangerous Addiction’ to Oil by 
2020”, The Independent, 25 April 2016, https://ind.pn/2WrsurF 
(accessed 5 February 2019). 
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nomic and social empowerment of women announced 
in the document was very quickly followed by con-
crete steps such as the lifting of the driving ban, the 
relaxation of clothing regulations, and the opening of 
certain occupations for female workers.17 The expan-
sion of the entertainment sector in the kingdom, also 
envisaged in Vision 2030, includes the opening of 
cinemas – banned up until 2016 – and other leisure 
facilities, and thus the opening up of new public 
spaces. 
Another key difference to previous development 
programmes is the financing of Vision 2030. The 
money will be raised from taxes that will be increased 
or newly introduced as well as from an SWF to be set 
up. Unlike the smaller neighbouring Gulf monarchies 
of Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, 
which have been building huge SWFs with their oil 
and gas export revenues for decades and investing 
part of their accumulated funds in foreign compa-
nies, the Saudi kingdom had transferred most of the 
corresponding budget surpluses to the central bank, 
SAMA. Although SAMA was occasionally perceived 
as an SWF, both in its self-description18 and in its 
narrower definition,19 the institution was a central 
bank with monetary and currency policy functions 
first and foremost. In contrast to the much more 
profit- and thus risk-oriented SWFs of the three neigh-
bouring countries, SAMA invested and continues to 
invest its foreign exchange reserves predominantly in 
fixed-interest investments (and US government bonds, 
in particular).20 
 
17 See Martin Hvidt, The New Role of Women in the New Saudi 
Arabian Economy (Odense: Syddansk Universitet, Center for 
Mellemøststudier, April 2018), https://portal.findresearcher. 
sdu.dk/en/publications/the-new-role-of-women-in-the-new-
saudi-arabian-economy. Special public attention was given 
to the announcement that, in the future, women will also 
be able to apply for (selected) positions in the military and 
at the public prosecutor’s office, see “12 Criteria for Saudi 
Women to Join Army As Soldiers”, Saudi Gazette, 26 February 
2018, http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/529295/SAUDI-
ARABIA/12-criteria-for-Saudi-women-to-join-army-as-soldiers 
(each accessed 5 February 2019). 
18 See Ahmed Banafe and Rory Macleod, The Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency, 1952–2016: Central Bank of Oil (Cham, 2017), 
194. 
19 See Li Yang and Jin Zhang, “Political and Economic 
Analysis on SWFs of Saudi Arabia”, Journal of Middle Eastern 
and Islamic Studies (in Asia) 6, no. 3 (2012): 28–57 (37). 
20 See Sara Bazoobandi, The Political Economy of the Gulf 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (Abingdon and New York, 2013), 26ff. 
Vision 2030 plans to develop the Public Investment 
Fund, a previously unknown financial vehicle, into 
the largest SWF in the world. By 2030, the PIF is to 
manage financial assets worth $2 trillion. It shall act 
as a “growth engine” for the Saudi economy as well 
as a new source of income for the kingdom. Indeed, 
in contrast to other projects such as Neom, which so 
far has only existed on paper,21 renewable energy 
projects that have been repeatedly modified,22 and 
postponed privatisation projects,23 the expansion of 
the PIF has been consistently pursued since 2016. 
 
 
21 Saeed Azhar, Katie Paul and Hadeel Al Sayegh, “Saudi 
Investment Ambitions Impress but Foreign Money May Be 
Slow to Come”, Reuters, 26 October 2017, https://reut.rs/30H9 
Rzd; Simeon Kerr and Anjli Raval, “Saudi Prince’s Flagship 
Plan Beset by Doubts after Khashoggi Death”, Financial Times, 
12 December 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/c24ab1d4-
f8a7-11e8-8b7c-6fa24bd5409c (both accessed 5 February 
2019). 
22 “Saudi Arabia Resets Renewable Energy Goals”, Power 
Technology (online), 22 January 2019, https://www.power-
technology.com/comment/saudi-renewable-energy-targets/ 
(accessed 5 February 2019). 
23 Sarah Algethami, “Saudis Set for $11 Billion Asset-Sale 
Blitz after Slow Start”, Bloomberg, 13 January 2019, https:// 
bloom.bg/2YMWUlP (accessed 5 February 2019). 
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The groundwork for the transformation of the PIF 
into an SWF was laid before the announcement of 
Vision 2030. Largely unnoticed by the public, the 
newly formed Saudi Economic Cabinet (CEDA) under 
Muhammad Bin Salman changed the institutional 
embedding of the PIF in March 2015, bringing the 
fund under direct control of the crown prince. In the 
spring of 2017, the government published the Public 
Investment Fund Program, which describes the re-
structuring and financing of the PIF as well as its 
mandate.24 The personnel changes that have taken 
place since then and the increase in the fund’s assets 
indicate that the Saudi leadership is serious about 
expanding the PIF. 
Official Objectives and Mandate 
Founded in 1971, the PIF was only one of several 
Saudi investment institutions until 2015. The fund’s 
task was to promote the activities of public enterprises 
in the domestic economy by granting loans. It was 
originally intended to act as an “Angel Investor”, pro-
viding financial support to companies in the startup 
phase, without staying invested over the long term. In 
fact, however, there were no such disinvestments, so 
that over the years the fund remained a silent partner 
in numerous Saudi state-owned companies, such as 
the chemicals and metals group Saudi Basic Indus-
tries Corporation (SABIC).25 In Vision 2030, the goals 
of the fund and its mandate were redefined: With the 
help of the PIF, state revenues are to be diversified, 
 
24 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Public Investment Fund 
Program (2018–2020), 2017, https://www.pif.gov.sa/style%20 
library/pifprograms/PIF%20Program_EN.pdf (accessed 8 May 
2019). 
25 Jean-Francois Seznec, “Saudi Arabia’s Sell Off of Aram-
co: Risk or Opportunity?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, 
no. 6 (2016): 378–83 (379). 
new economic sectors are to be opened up – espe-
cially for private-sector involvement – and FDI is to 
be directed to Saudi Arabia, which the Saudi leader-
ship hopes will lead to knowledge and technology 
transfer.26 The PIF is not explicitly intended to be a 
savings fund with the aim of forming state reserves 
for the future.27 Rather, it has the character of a stabi-
lisation and development fund with the tasks of 
shielding the state budget from fluctuations in com-
modity prices and external shocks, improving the 
competitiveness of the Saudi economy through 
planned investments, and attracting foreign com-
panies and know-how to the kingdom. 
In order to meet its new requirements, the fund 
will no longer function as a passive financing partner 
and lender.28 Rather, it is now to act much more 
actively and invest in (1) existing Saudi companies, 
(2) Saudi companies to be established, (3) real estate 
and infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, (4) “Giga” develop-
ment projects, (5) international strategic partnerships 
with funds and companies, and (6) international 
capital investments with a long-term profit orienta-
tion.29 This explicitly gives the fund the mandate to 
 
26 The responsibilities of the PIF in implementing “Vision 
2030” are set out in the key document itself (Vision 2030 
[see note 2], 42) and the four objectives defined in the Public 
Investment Fund Program (see note 24), 12–15. 
27 For a typology of the organisational models of SWFs, see 
Abdullah Al-Hassan, Michael Papaioannou, Martin Skancke 
and Cheng Chih Sung, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Aspects of Gov-
ernance Structures and Investment Management, IMF Working 
Paper WP/13/231 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund [IMF], 2013), 10ff. 
28 Matthew Martin, “Saudi Wealth Fund to Cut Back on 
Lending in Transformation Plan”, Bloomberg Quint Business 
News (online), 11 October 2016, http://www.bloombergquint. 
com/business/saudi-wealth-fund-to-cut-back-on-lending-in-
transformation-plan#gs.jh5UT6Fn (accessed 14 February 2019). 
29 See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Public Investment Fund 
Program (2018–2020) (see note 24), 22f. 
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operate abroad as well. By 2020 it should hold a 
quarter – and by 2030 even half – of its investments 
abroad,30 and thus be transformed into a “global in-
vestment powerhouse” and “the world’s most impact-
ful investor”.31 
Institutional and Personnel Structure 
Until 2015, the PIF was subordinated to the Ministry 
of Finance, which in the past had acted rather tech-
nocratically and did not fall within the direct sphere 
of influence of a member of the ruling Saud family.32 
Decree 270/2015 changed this competence.33 The fund 
was now directly subordinated to CEDA, and thus to 
the control of Crown Prince Bin Salman.34 Unlike, for 
example, the Norwegian SWF, which is managed by 
the Norwegian central bank on behalf of the Ministry 
of Finance, the PIF operates within the framework of 
an investment company model:35 It is both the owner 
and manager of the fund’s assets. 
The special position of the PIF in the institutional 
framework of Saudi Arabia and the tailoring of the 
fund to the person of the crown prince are reflected 
in the composition of the Board of Directors (BoD). 
Whereas in the past the BoD was composed of state 
officials (representatives of various ministries and 
other administrative organisations and the governor 
 
30 Andrew Torchia, Stephen Kalin and Marwa Rashad, 
“Saudi’s PIF Invested in 50–60 Firms via SoftBank Fund”, 
Reuters, 23 October 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
saudi-investment-pif/saudis-pif-invested-in-50-60-firms-via-
softbank-fund-director-idUSKCN1MX12X (accessed 15 Janu-
ary 2019). 
31 See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Public Investment Fund 
Program (2018–2020) (see note 24), 21. 
32 With the exception of the period between 1962 and 
1975, the Ministry was not run by members of the ruling 
family, but by technocrats, see Stig Stenslie, Regime Stability 
in Saudi Arabia. The Challenge of Succession (Abingdon and New 
York, 2012). 
33 See decree 270/2015 (in Arabic), with the author. 
34 Further administrative and financial independence was 
granted to the fund by an amendment to the law in Decem-
ber 2018, which does not appear to have yet entered into 
force, see Robert Anderson, “Saudi’s Shoura Council Ap-
proves Law Granting the PIF Greater Independence”, Gulf 
Business (online), 6 December 2018, https://gulfbusiness.com/ 
saudis-shoura-council-approves-law-granting-the-public-
investment-fund-greater-independence/ (accessed 15 January 
2019). 
35 Al-Hassan et al., Sovereign Wealth Funds (see note 27), 10ff. 
of the central bank), Decree 270/2015 now merely 
stipulates that the chair of the BoD is to be held by 
the head of CEDA, Crown Prince Bin Salman. Other 
members of the BoD are appointed by the prime 
minister and thus, in effect, by the king, without 
having to be state officials. Since 2016, in addition 
to Crown Prince Bin Salman, the BoD has eight mem-
bers, including six ministers.36 However, their ap-
pointment to the BoD is not due to their government 
positions, but rather to their personal proximity to 
the crown prince. This applies in particular to Khalid 
al-Falih (Energy) and Muhammad al-Jadaan (Finance) 
as well as Minister of State Muhammad al-Shaikh. It is 
striking that the Saudi central bank is no longer rep-
resented in the BoD. Its previous role as manager of 
the state’s assets has thus been noticeably curtailed. 
Special powers have been granted to the managing 
director. Yasir al-Rumayyan, who is also a member of 
the fund’s BoD and one of the crown prince’s closest 
personal confidants, has held this position since Sep-
tember 2015. Al-Rumayyan has no political mandate 
but is part of the country’s more informal key com-
mand and control centres. The former investment 
banker has considerable political influence through 
his chairmanship of the Decision Support Center, 
which was founded in 2016.37 He is also a director of 
the Saudi Industrial Development Fund and the state-
owned oil company, Saudi Aramco. In addition, 
Al-Rumayyan represents the interests of the PIF on 
the Boards of Directors of the fund’s major holdings.38 
Crown Prince Bin Salman exerts mas-
sive influence on the day-to-day busi-
ness of the PIF through his offices. 
After 2015, the internal governance structures of 
the PIF were also fundamentally redesigned and now 
 
36 See “Public Investment Fund – Board Members”, Public 
Investment Fund (online), https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/Pages/ 
Leadership.aspx (accessed 15 January 2019). 
37 The founding of the Decision Support Center was an-
nounced in the “Vision 2030”, see Vision 2030 (see note 2), 
83. The Center, which is barely visible from the outside, is 
located directly at the royal court and apparently serves as 
the crown prince’s central advisory body. In the operative 
implementation of the “Vision 2030”, the Center therefore 
plays a decisive role; see interviews by the author with Saudi 
analysts, Berlin and Riyadh, June and July 2018. 
38 See also “Biography: Yasir O. Al-Rumayyan”, SoftBank 
Group, https://group.softbank/en/corp/about/officer/ 
al-rumayyan/ (accessed 15 January 2019). 
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largely follow the recommendations formulated by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for SWFs.39 
Individual internal responsibilities have been rede-
fined to ensure that the expanding fund is managed 
as efficiently as possible. This became more urgent 
when the staff of the PIF was significantly increased 
from 2015 onwards. Initially, only around 40 people 
worked for the fund; by the end of 2018, the figure 
had already risen to 450.40 In addition, there was the 
task of coordinating the numerous international in-
vestment service providers who assisted the fund. In 
addition, efforts were made to fill important positions 
within the fund with international investment bank-
ers. The fund’s close ties to the crown prince, how-
ever, meant that this undertaking proved to be not 
an easy one.41 Bin Salman exerts massive influence 
on the day-to-day business of the PIF within the BoD 
through his offices as chairman of the Executive and 
Remuneration Committees, which are also respon-
sible for filling important management positions.42 
Observers have therefore already described the fund 
as a “one-man investment vehicle”.43 
Funding 
The PIF’s programme states that the SWF should grow 
to $400 billion by 2020. In fact, between December 
2015 and September 2017, the PIF’s assets had already 
increased by almost 50 per cent, from $152 billion 
to $224 billion.44 By November 2018 the fund assets 
 
39 For the IMF recommendation, see Al-Hassan et al., 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (see note 27); for the governance 
structure of the PIF, see Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Public 
Investment Fund Program (2018–2020) (see note 24), 25ff. 
40 “Saudi Arabia’s PIF Hires Former IFC Official As Chief 
Economist”, Reuters, 17 March 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/saudi-pif/saudi-arabias-pif-hires-former-ifc-official-as-
chief-economist-idUSL8N2140BF (accessed 9 May 2019). 
41 Rory Jones, “Expats Flee Saudi Fund, Bemoan Crown 
Prince Control”, The Wall Street Journal, 31 December 2018, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/expats-flee-saudi-fund-bemoan-
crown-prince-control-11546257600 (accessed 15 January 
2019). 
42 See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Public Investment Fund 
Program (2018–2020) (see note 24), 25. 
43 Andrew England and Simeon Kerr, “How the Kashoggi 
Killing Threatens the Prince’s Project”, Financial Times, 22 
October 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/227c99dc-d2b5-
11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5 (accessed 8 May 2018). 
44 See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Public Investment Fund 
Program (2018–2020) (see note 24), 12. 
were valued at $360 billion.45 The composition of this 
capital inflow of around $72 billion (between Decem-
ber 2015 and September 2017) and $208 billion 
(between December 2015 and November 2018) is not 
comprehensible in detail due to the lack of available 
statistics. In principle, the PIF’s programme describes 
four major sources of funding: These include capital 
injections by the government, the transfer of govern-
ment assets to the PIF, borrowing, and earnings from 
investments. 
Capital Transfers 
In financial circles, there have been rumours since 
2016 that part of the central bank’s reserves are trans-
ferred to the PIF. Indeed, between 2015 and 2017, 
the Saudi central bank, SAMA, recorded a significant 
decline in foreign exchange reserves. Only a part of 
these outflows, amounting to $120 billion, can be 
explained by the high budget deficits of those years, 
which had to be financed.46 A transfer of only $26 
billion, ordered by King Salman in November 2016, 
was publicly announced.47 This was preceded by a 
replacement of the governor of SAMA as part of a 
comprehensive government reshuffle, apparently 
initiated by the crown prince. Market observers 
expect SAMA, under the new central bank governor, 
Ahmed al-Kholifey, to focus in the future more on 
its role as a guardian of the currency and its task 
of overseeing the financial sector, rather than the 
management of Saudi state assets, as was the case 
in the past.48 
There are also rumours about another source of 
capital transfers for the PIF: the private wealth of 
members of the Saudi elite. In November 2017, hun-
 
45 See Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, “Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Rankings by Total Assets”, updated November 2018, 
SWFI (online), https://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-
fund-rankings/ (accessed 15 January 2019). 
46 Andrew Torchia, “The Mysterious (and Continuing) Fall 
in Saudi Foreign Reserves”, Reuters, 27 June 2017, https://reut. 
rs/2JBxRyt (accessed 15 January 2019). 
47 “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Directs to Allocate 
SR 100 Billion from Kingdom’s Reserves for PIF Account”, 
Saudi Press Agency, 30 November 2016, https://www.spa.gov.sa/ 
1564833?lang=ar&newsid=1564833 (accessed 15 January 
2019). 
48 Simeon Kerr, “The Saudi Reshuffle: Five Key Reforms 
in Riyadh”, Financial Times, 9 May 2016, https://www.ft.com/ 
content/0a8bd756-15c6-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e (accessed 
15 January 2019). 
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dreds of people – including members of the Saud 
family, prominent businessmen, and state officials – 
were arrested at the Ritz Carlton luxury hotel in 
Riyadh.49 Officially, this extensive internment, some-
times lasting months, was presented as a blow to 
corruption. According to that narrative, the kingdom 
wanted to create new “fair and very transparent” 
framework conditions for investors by taking action 
against princes, politicians, and businessmen who 
had illegally enriched themselves.50 In view of the 
lack of transparency of the corruption investigations, 
which were carried out without any procedures based 
on the rule of law, this was a hardly comprehensible 
reason. But even the explanation given by observers 
that Muhammad Bin Salman wanted to get rid of ad-
versaries and potential competitors within the royal 
elite also falls short of the mark. The robust approach 
is more likely to have damaged the crown prince’s 
reputation within the elite, especially since among 
those arrested were also persons who could apparently 
hardly have become dangerous to Bin Salman.51 
Apparently, the campaign aimed primarily at 
collecting money for the state treasury.52 A newly 
created anti-corruption agency was given extensive 
powers to investigate and prosecute corruption as 
well as reach out-of-court settlements. By transferring 
part of their assets to the state, the defendants were 
able to “buy” their freedom. Little is known about the 
details of the individual settlement agreements. Only 
in the case of Prince Miteb Bin Abdullah, a son of the 
former king, was a payment of about $1 billion re-
 
49 Ben Hubbard, David D. Kirkpatrick, Kate Kelly and 
Mark Mazzetti, “Saudis Said to Use Coercion and Abuse to 
Seize Billions”, New York Times, 11 March 2018, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/03/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-
corruption-mohammed-bin-salman.html (accessed 15 Janu-
ary 2019). 
50 Holly Ellyatt and Hadley Gamble, “‘Saudi Arabia Is 
Different Today’: Kingdom Seeks to Reassure Investors after 
Corruption Crackdown”, CNBC, 24 January 2018, http://www. 
cnbc.com/2018/01/24/saudi-arabia-seeks-to-reassure-investors-
after-corruption-crackdown.html (accessed 15 January 2019). 
51 Andrew Leber and Christopher Carothers, “Is the Saudi 
Purge Really About Corruption?”, Foreign Affairs, 15 Novem-
ber 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-
11-15/saudi-purge-really-about-corruption (accessed 15 Janu-
ary 2019). 
52 “Cash Settlements from Saudi Purge to Continue in 
2019”, Arabian Business (online), 20 December 2018, http:// 
bit.ly/2VYdBOk (accessed 15 January 2019). 
ported.53 In January 2018, according to the attorney 
general, the sum of the settlement payments reached 
$100 billion, including the equivalent values for 
ceded shareholdings and transferred land holdings.54 
Already during the wave of arrests at the end of 2017, 
Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi reported rumours 
that the confiscated companies would be subordinated 
to the PIF. On several occasions, however, the Saudi 
government underlined that the management of the 
confiscated assets would be taken over solely by 
the Ministry of Finance and not by the PIF. A link to 
the SWF could nevertheless exist: According to media 
reports, a separate holding company was set up to 
manage the confiscated assets; this company would 
be managed by a senior manager of the PIF’s sub-
sidiary Sanabil Investments.55 
Transfer of Aramco Ownership Rights 
Vision 2030 already defined the most important 
source of financing for the PIF: the ownership rights 
to the state-owned oil company, Saudi Aramco.56 This 
company has the exclusive right to extract the coun-
try’s hydrocarbon resources. Because of this as well as 
numerous other business activities that now extend 
far beyond the oil and gas sector, Saudi Aramco is not 
only the most important employer in Saudi Arabia, but 
above all the most valuable company in the world, 
with an estimated market value of up to $2 trillion.57 
 
53 “Saudi Anti-corruption Drive: Prince Miteb Freed ‘after 
$1bn Deal’”, BBC News, 29 November 2017, https://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-middle-east-42161552 (accessed 15 January 
2019). 
54 “Attorney General: Total Number of Subpoenaed In-
dividuals Reached 381”, Saudi Press Agency, 30 January 2018, 
https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid= 
1714970 (accessed 15 January 2019). 
55 Hani Halawani, a member of the management of 
Sanabil Investments, an investment arm of the PIF, has been 
appointed head of this new institution, see Matthew Martin, 
Patrick Winters and Jan-Henrik Foerster, “Saudi Arabia to Set 
Up Entity for Assets Taken in Crackdown”, Bloomberg, 12 De-
cember 2017, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
12-12/saudi-arabia-said-to-set-up-entity-for-assets-taken-in-
crackdown (accessed 15 January 2019). 
56 Vision 2030 (see note 2), 42. 
57 See Samantha Gross, “The Saudi Aramco IPO Is a Game-
changer for the Saudi Economy”, Brookings Institution, 6 June 
2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/06/the-
saudi-aramco-ipo-is-a-game-changer-for-the-saudi-economy/ 
(accessed 16 January 2019). How high the market value 
actually is can hardly be reliably estimated due to the lack 
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Formally, Saudi Aramco reports to the “Aramco 
Supreme Council”, created in 2015 and headed by 
Crown Prince Bin Salman. The council acts as the 
representative of the sole shareholder, the Saudi 
state.58 A transfer of ownership would assign this 
role to the PIF. This would significantly increase the 
fund’s value. Vision 2030 also includes the plan for 
an IPO of Aramco, which could provide the SWF with 
enormous liquidity.59 The original plan was to con-
vert Aramco into a listed company as early as 2018, 
sell around 5 per cent of the company’s shares on 
the stock market, and allocate the capital to the PIF.60 
The possibility of a listing on an international stock 
exchange was also considered. 
In June 2018, King Salman himself 
surprisingly stopped the IPO. 
Reportedly, the resistance was 
too strong. 
Outside and inside Aramco, the attempt to shift 
ownership and control structures met considerable 
resistance. While prominent Saudi economist Essam 
al-Zamil, who was arrested in September 2017, warned 
of the economic risks of an IPO,61 Aramco executives 
apparently feared above all that external actors could 
gain significantly better insight into the company’s 
activities.62 
 
of company data. While the Saudi government insists on 
its estimate of $2 trillion, analysts assume that the market 
value will be significantly lower in some cases, see “The 
Aramco Accounts: Inside the World’s Most Profitable Com-
pany”, Bloomberg, 13 April 2018, https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2018-04-13/the-aramco-accounts-inside-the-
world-s-most-profitable-company (accessed 15 January 2019). 
58 See Ellen R. Wald, Crucial Insights from the Saudi Aramco 
2018 Charter (Washington, D.C.: Arabia Foundation, 21 
March 2018), 3, https://www.arabiafoundation.org/arabia-
report/crucial-insights-from-the-saudi-aramco-2018-charter/ 
(accessed 29 March 2019). 
59 Vision 2030 (see note 2), 43. 
60 Gross, “The Saudi Aramco IPO” (see note 57). 
61 “Saudi Economist Who Criticized Aramco IPO Charged 
with Terrorism: Activists”, Reuters, 1 October 2018, https:// 
reut.rs/2EsSpFm (accessed 16 January 2019). The plans for an 
IPO in Saudi Arabia were criticised only in the private sector. 
The arrest of al-Zamil has once again shown that such public 
expressions of opinion are highly dangerous. 
62 Interviews of the author with an analyst close to the 
company, Riyadh, July 2018. 
In June 2018, King Salman himself surprisingly 
stopped the IPO.63 Reportedly, resistance from the 
company – but also from members of the ruling 
family and the king’s leading advisors – was too 
strong. However, shortly after the royal family’s an-
nouncement of the temporary halt to the IPO, it 
became known that Aramco was negotiating with 
the PIF to acquire SABIC, a chemicals and metals 
company controlled by the SWF.64 The company, 
which is listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange, had a 
market capitalisation of more than $100 billion at 
that time.65 Instead of simply transferring the 70 per 
cent stake held by the PIF to Aramco, the oil company 
was urged to stem a costly acquisition – partially 
credit-financed66 – of Aramco. In March 2019, Saudi 
Aramco agreed to buy SABIC’s shares of the PIF for 
$69.1 billion.67 Above all, the crown prince announced 
at the end of 2018 that the IPO would be resumed 
after the successful takeover of SABIC. According to 
Bin Salman, the PIF would thus receive a total cash 
inflow of up to $180 billion between 2019 and 2021.68 
 
63 “Exclusive: Saudi King Tipped the Scale against Aramco 
IPO Plans”, Reuters, 27 August 2018, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-saudi-aramco-ipo-king-exclusive/exclusive-saudi-
king-tipped-the-scale-against-aramco-ipo-plans-idUSKCN1LC 
1MX (accessed 16 January 2019). 
64 Rania El Gamal, “Saudi Aramco Aims to Buy Controlling 
Stake in SABIC”, Reuters, 23 July 2018, http://www.reuters. 
com/article/sabic-ma-saudi-aramco/saudi-aramco-aims-to-buy-
controlling-stake-in-sabic-sources-idUSL5N1UI0FI (accessed 
16 January 2019). 
65 Andrew Torchia and Rania El Gamal, “SABIC Deal Lets 
Saudi Arabia Delay Aramco IPO, Spend on Growth”, Reuters, 
23 July 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-
aramco-ipo-delay/sabic-deal-lets-saudi-arabia-delay-aramco-
ipo-spend-on-growth-sources-idUSKBN1KD12S (accessed 
16 January 2019). 
66 Anthony Dipaola and Vivian Nereim, “Oil Giant Saudi 
Aramco to Issue First Global Bond This Year”, Bloomberg, 
9 January 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2019-01-09/saudi-oil-giant-aramco-to-issue-first-ever-global-
bond-this-year (accessed 16 January 2019). 
67 Marwa Rashad, Rania El Gamal and Hadeel Al Sayegh, 
“Saudi Aramco to Buy SABIC in $69 Billion Chemicals Mega-
deal”, Reuters, 27 March 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-aramco-sabic-m-a/saudi-aramco-to-buy-sabic-in-69-
billion-chemicals-megadeal-idUSKCN1R81QU (accessed 
16 May 2019). 
68 Stephanie Flanders et al., “Saudi Crown Prince Discusses 
Trump, Aramco, Arrests”, Bloomberg, 5 October 2018, https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-05/saudi-crown-
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Borrowing 
Especially after the temporary postponement of 
the Aramco IPO, the PIF needed to borrow money in 
order to achieve its investment and growth objectives. 
In summer 2018, the SWF received an $11 billion 
loan from an international banking consortium. It 
was able to secure the same favourable conditions as 
the kingdom itself, which also had to increase its for-
eign debt due to the tight budget situation.69 Further 
loans are to be taken out in 2019.70 The procedure is 
quite unusual for an SWF, whose task, as a rule, is to 
increase its sovereign wealth in the long term. There-
fore, this step once again illustrates the special role of 
the PIF: It should not only be managing government 
surpluses, but also begin operating as an “active in-
vestor” as soon as possible.71 
Investment Returns 
Compared to the three other sources of financing, the 
generation of own returns currently plays a compara-
tively minor role in building up the fund’s assets. 
By 2015, the PIF was expected to have generated rev-
enues of SAR 20 billion ($5.3 billion).72 This means 
that the fund was still a long way from its self-im-
posed return targets, which ranged between 6.5 per 
cent and 9 per cent a year. 
 
prince-discusses-trump-aramco-arrests-transcript (accessed 
18 January 2019). 
69 Dasha Afanasieva, “Saudi Sovereign Fund PIF Raises $11 
Billion Loan”, Reuters, 24 August 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/ 
article/us-saudi-aramco-ipo-loan/saudi-sovereign-fund-pif-
raises-11-billion-loan-source-idUKKCN1L90WK (accessed 
18 January 2019). 
70 Sam Meredith, “Saudi Arabia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Aims to Tap Debt Markets Twice This Year after ‘Amazing’ 
Market Response”, CNBC, 1 May 2019, http://www.cnbc.com/ 
2019/05/01/saudi-arabias-sovereign-wealth-fund-aims-to-tap-
debt-markets-twice-in-2019.html (accessed 18 May 2019). 
71 Rory Jones, “In Rare Step, Saudi’s Sovereign-Wealth 
Fund Raises $11 Billion Loan”, The Wall Street Journal, 
17 September 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-rare-step-
saudis-sovereign-wealth-fund-raises-11-billion-loan-15371706 
90 (accessed 18 January 2019). 
72 Matthew Martin, “Saudi Wealth Fund to Cut Back on 
Lending in Transformation Plan”, Bloomberg, 17 October 
2016, https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/saudi-
wealth-fund-to-cut-back-on-lending-in-transformation-plan 
%23gs.w88OXgKM (accessed 18 January 2019). 
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The pace at which the Saudi leadership is driving the 
expansion of the PIF into an SWF is remarkable in 
two respects. First, at the end of 2014, the Saudi gov-
ernment explicitly rejected the creation of an SWF. 
With reference to the successfully conservatively 
managed central bank reserves, the then–Saudi 
finance minister, Ibrahim al-Assaf – now himself 
a member of the BoD of the PIF, and since the end 
of 2018 foreign minister of the kingdom – had de-
scribed the creation of an SWF as unnecessary.73 On 
the other hand, the idea of an SWF is not to be found 
in the McKinsey study, which represents the blue-
print for Vision 2030. Against this backdrop, it is even 
more remarkable that the economic objectives now 
linked to the PIF remain also rather vague in Vision 
2030 itself and the accompanying documents. In the 
following, it is therefore examined to what extent the 
PIF can actually achieve the three identified objec-
tives, namely (1) the diversification of government 
revenues, (2) the development of new economic sec-
tors, especially in order to strengthen private entre-
preneurship, and (3) the promotion of FDI with the 
secondary objective of enabling knowledge and tech-
nology transfer to the kingdom. 
Development of a New Public 
Source of Income 
The declared goal of Vision 2030 is to diversify gov-
ernment revenues. The PIF should act as a stabilisa-
tion fund in the sense of the IMF typology: Through 
return-oriented investments, the fund shall provide 
Saudi Arabia with income from new sources that will 
 
73 See Marwa Rashad and Andrew Torchia, “Saudi Finance 
Minister Says No Need to Create Sovereign Wealth Fund”, 
Reuters, 26 December 2014, https://reut.rs/2YMb1YE (accessed 
9 May 2019). 
enable it to reduce its dependence on oil exports.74 
However, it has not yet been decided whether – and 
how – the fund will contribute to the financing of 
the state budget. At least for financial years 2018 and 
2019, no revenue from the PIF will be transferred to 
the Ministry of Finance.75 Without mechanisms to 
ensure that the financial returns of the SWF benefit 
the budget of the kingdom, the expansion of the PIF 
will create a self-contained fiscal parallel structure 
that is, in addition, not subject to adequate state 
supervision. Legal amendments that were approved 
by the Shura council in 2018 largely guarantee the 
fund financial and administrative independence.76 
It is therefore unlikely that the activities of the fund 
will be controlled by the Saudi Arabia General Audit-
ing Bureau. Also, unlike almost all other state insti-
tutions, the PIF is not mentioned in the National 
Transformation Program.77 All of this indicates that 
the fund and its activities are separate from the gen-
eral economic and budgetary planning. 
 
74 Vision 2030 (see note 2), 42. 
75 Marwa Rashad and Stephen Kalin, “Saudi Finance 
Minister Says PIF Policy Is Based on Medium to Long-term 
Investments”, Reuters, 18 December 2018, https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-saudi-pif/saudi-finance-minister-says-
pif-policy-is-based-on-medium-to-long-term-investments-
idUSKBN1OH20G (accessed 25 January 2019). 
76 Robert Anderson, “Saudi’s Shoura Council Approves 
Law Granting the PIF Greater Independence”, Gulf Business, 
6 December 2018, https://gulfbusiness.com/saudis-shoura-
council-approves-law-granting-the-public-investment-fund-
greater-independence/ (accessed 9 May 2019). 
77 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 – National Trans-
formation Program 2020, http://vision2030.gov.sa/sites/default/ 
files/NTP_En.pdf (accessed 25 January 2019). 
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The expansion of the PIF will create a 
self-contained fiscal parallel structure. 
Such parallel structures are not new for the king-
dom. In the 1990s, for example, billions of US dollars 
were administered in extra-budgetary programmes, 
to which only a few members of the royal family had 
access.78 What is also not new is that, in the course 
of the accession of a new king, new institutions were 
created or existing ones expanded.79 What is new, 
however, is the volume of the extra-budgetary ad-
ministered funds. The annual income of the PIF could 
soon exceed even the budgets of individual minis-
tries. In the long term, once the fund has been filled, 
it could not only receive returns from the investments 
it has made. According to the Saudi minister of eco-
nomics and planning, oil revenues that are not needed 
to cover government expenditures could also be trans-
ferred to the PIF.80 Above all, however, according to 
the announcements in Vision 2030, the fund would 
gain direct access to part of the country’s oil revenues, 
even before they flow into the regular state budget, by 
transferring the ownership of Saudi Aramco to the PIF. 
To date, Saudi Aramco transfers its earnings – 
which generate 68 per cent of public revenues – in 
the form of royalties, taxes, and dividends to the pub-
lic budget. After a transfer of the ownership rights to 
the PIF, rent fees and taxes would continue to flow 
into the state treasury. However, the dividends would 
be paid to the shareholder, that is, the PIF (see Figure 
1, p. 18). This change in state revenue flows would be 
all the more remarkable given that Saudi Aramco’s 
income tax was massively reduced by royal decree at 
the beginning of 2017. As a result, corporate profit 
after taxes has increased significantly, and the oil 
company was able to pay out dividends for 2017 and 
2018 of $50 billion and $58 billion respectively, many 
 
78 “Saudi Royal Wealth: Where Do They Get All That 
Money?” (cable 96RIYADH4784_a), Riyadh, 30 November 
1996, Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 
96RIYADH4784_a.html (accessed 25 January 2019). 
79 See Steffen Hertog, “Challenges to the Saudi Distribu-
tional State in the Age of Austerity”, in Salman’s Legacy: The 
Dilemmas of a New Era in Saudi Arabia, ed. Madawi Al-Rasheed 
(Oxford, 2018), 89. 
80 Anjli Raval and Simeon Kerr, “Oil Cash Set to Boost 
Saudi Arabia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund”, Financial Times, 
9 March 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/aff55882-2372-
11e8-add1-0e8958b189ea (accessed 25 January 2019). 
times higher than in 2016 (around $3 billion).81 
Should these dividend payments not – or only par-
tially – be passed on to the state budget by the PIF, 
it would have a considerable loss of revenue.82 In 
2018, for example, the dividend payment accounted 
for around a quarter of the total state revenue of the 
kingdom.83 Consequently, these dividends would 
build up a huge shadow budget under the umbrella 
of the PIF in the future. It remains completely un-
certain what these funds will ultimately be used for, 
and whether they will actually benefit the Saudi state. 
Empirical studies of such extra-budgetary households 
in other contexts show that they not only potentially 
undermine the solidity of state fiscal policy and budg-
etary discipline, but are also a gateway for political 
and administrative corruption.84 
Development and Diversification of the 
Corporate Sector 
In addition to its fiscal stabilisation function, the PIF 
is to assume the role of a development fund. It should 
 
81 See Saudi Aramco, Global Medium Term Note Programme 
(Base Prospectus), 1 April 2019, 54, https://www.rns-pdf. 
londonstockexchange.com/rns/6727U_1-2019-4-1.pdf 
(accessed 9 May 2019). In part, the massive increase in the 
dividend may also be attributable to an overall increase 
in corporate earnings due to higher oil prices. 
82 According to the Saudi finance minister, this tax reduc-
tion would not change the situation for the state, as falling 
tax revenues would be offset by stable dividend payments. 
However, this does not indicate whether these dividends will 
actually flow into the regular state budget, see Anjli Raval, 
“Saudi Arabia Slashes Aramco’s Tax Rate to Woo IPO Inves-
tors”, Financial Times, 27 March 2017, https://www.ft.com/ 
content/7bf1cfa6-1302-11e7-80f4-13e067d5072c (accessed 
15 January 2019). 
83 Own calculation. For the dividend payment, see Saudi 
Aramco, Global Medium Term Note Programme (see note 81), 54; 
for the state budget, see Ministry of Finance, Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, Budget Statement, Fiscal Year 2019, https://www. 
mof.gov.sa/en/financialreport/budget2019/Documents/Budget
%20Statement%202019.pdf (accessed 22 May 2019). 
84 See Richard Allen and Dimitar Radev, Extrabudgetary 
Funds – Technical Notes and Manuals (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 
June 2010), 9ff., https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tnm/ 
2010/tnm1009.pdf; see also International Budget Partner-
ship, Guide to Transparency in Public Finances. Looking beyond the 
Core Budget (Washington, D.C., October 2011), http://www. 
internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Looking-Beyond-
the-Budget.pdf (both accessed 9 May 2019). 
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not only facilitate the major infrastructure and mod-
ernisation projects announced in the context of 
Vision 2030, such as the construction of the high-tech 
city of Neom, but above all also act as an “enabler of 
the private sector”85 and help to open up new capital-
intensive economic sectors.86 Thus, the expansion of 
the private sector is the declared goal of Vision 2030. 
Its share of Saudi Arabia’s total economic output is to 
be increased from 40 to 65 per cent.87 
The PIF plays a key role in the develop-
ment of entirely new economic 
sectors such as tourism and the 
defence industry. 
In fact, the PIF is the driving force behind the im-
plementation of the numerous development and 
infrastructure projects under Vision 2030, which 
demonstrates once more how strongly the fund’s 
 
85 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Public Investment Fund 
Program (2018–2020) (see note 24), 21. 
86 Vision 2030 (see note 2), 42. 
87 Ibid., 53. 
decision-making is influenced by politics.88 The PIF 
also plays a key role in the development of entirely 
new economic sectors such as tourism and the de-
fence industry. The promotion of the entertainment 
sector announced in Vision 2030, for example, is 
being pursued decisively by the PIF subsidiary Saudi 
Entertainment Ventures Company (SEVEN, formerly 
Development and Investment Entertainment Com-
pany89). In spring 2018, the company was granted 
its first licence to operate cinemas in the kingdom.90 
 
88 “PIF Explores Investment in King Abdullah Economic 
City”, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 7 September 2016, http:// 
country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=704582254&Country=
Saudi%20Arabia&topic=Economy&subt_6 (accessed 25 Janu-
ary 2019). 
89 Katie Paul, “Saudi PIF Entertainment Company Plans to 
Build Leisure Complex in Riyadh”, Reuters, 2 January 2019, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-entertainment/ 
saudi-pif-entertainment-company-plans-to-build-leisure-
complex-in-riyadh-idUSKCN1OW11X (accessed 25 January 
2019). 
90 “Development & Investment Entertainment Company 
Plans with AMC to Establish 30 Cinemas in 15 Saudi Cities”, 
Saudi Press Agency, 5 April 2018, http://bit.ly/2WlKbsx (accessed 
25 January 2019). 
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Over the next 12 years, SEVEN intends to invest $2.7 
billion in Saudi Arabia.91 In addition, the SWF is 
financing a large part of the huge Qiddiya leisure 
complex south-west of Riyadh. Investments are also 
to be made in the tourism sector, which shall be ex-
panded massively according to Vision 2030 guide-
lines. The Red Sea Development Company, wholly 
owned by the SWF, wants to build tourist resorts on 
the Red Sea. 
The Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) 
holding company – a PIF subsidiary founded in May 
2017 – is responsible for establishing its own Saudi 
defence industry. In 2017, Saudi Arabia had the third-
highest defence spending in the world ($69.4 billion92), 
with less than 5 per cent of the funds spent flowing 
into the national economy. The goal of Vision 2030 is 
to let domestic suppliers benefit from 50 per cent of 
Saudi arms expenditures and to make the country 
one of the world’s 25 largest arms producers by 2030. 
SAMI is to act as an “active holding company” for this 
purpose and, in particular, to promote national arms 
production through alliances with international com-
panies.93 This is not only a matter of self-sufficiency 
in arms but also of exports – above all to friendly 
states in the region.94 
The PIF already has a very extensive 
investment portfolio. 
Besides new activities, the PIF already has a very 
extensive investment portfolio. Not least the sale of 
the chemicals and metals group SABIC illustrates the 
considerable role that the SWF plays in the domestic 
 
91 Samuel Wendel, “Emirati Film Shabab Sheyab Set to 
Become First GCC Movie to Play in Saudi Cinemas”, Middle 
East Forbes, 9 November 2018, https://www.forbesmiddleeast. 
com/emirati-film-shabab-sheyab-set-to-become-first-gcc-
movie-to-play-in-saudi-cinemas (accessed 25 January 2019). 
92 Nan Tian et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure 2017 
(Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
[SIPRI], May 2018), 2, http://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/ 
2018-04/sipri_fs_1805_milex_2017.pdf (accessed 25 January 
2019). 
93 See interview with the (German) CEO of SAMI, Andreas 
Schwer, in Defense News TV, 27 August 2018, http://bit.ly/2Es7kja; 
see also Shaul Shay, The Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), 
Herzliya Conference Papers, April 2018, https://www.idc.ac.il/ 
en/research/ips/2018/Documents/ShaulShaySAMI22April18. 
pdf (both accessed 25 January 2019). 
94 See interview with the (German) CEO of SAMI, Andreas 
Schwer (see note 93). 
economy today. In the banking sector alone, the PIF 
is the most important shareholder in four financial 
institutions, which together have a market share 
(financial assets) of 45 per cent (see Figure 2, p. 20).95 
In the cement industry, the market share of the com-
panies in which the PIF is the largest shareholder is 
also over 40 per cent.96 In the mining sector, the PIF 
holds more than two-thirds of the shares in the mar-
ket leader, Saudi Arabian Mining Company. In the 
food sector, companies such as Savola, Almarai, and 
Nadec, where the PIF is also one of the largest share-
holders, are market leaders in a number of product 
segments.97 
From an economic point of view, however, such 
investments by the PIF are only economically viable 
if they are actually intended as startup financing. 
Otherwise, the objective of private-sector develop-
ment set out in Vision 2030 would be undermined.98 
However, there is no sign that the PIF will withdraw 
 
95 The banks concerned are the National Commercial 
Bank, Samba, Riyadh Bank and Alinma Bank. For market 
shares, see AlJazira Capital, ed., Saudi Banking Sector, Quarterly 
Report, 2Q-2018, September 2018, http://www.aljaziracapital. 
com.sa/report_file/ess/SEC-576.pdf. The planned expansion 
of the Bahraini Gulf International Bank in the Saudi market 
could further increase its market share in the future. The PIF 
holds 97 per cent of the shares in the bank, see “GIB Share-
holders”, Gulf International Bank (online), https://www.gib.com/ 
en/shareholders. In December 2018, plans were announced 
according to which the PIF would promote the establishment 
of a regional “mega-bank” through mergers in the banking 
sector, see “Saudi Arabia Eyes Deal to Create $182bn Mega 
Bank”, Arabian Business, 24 December 2018, https://www. 
arabianbusiness.com/banking-finance/410293-saudi-arabia-
said-to-be-exploring-more-bank-mergers (all accessed 6 Feb-
ruary 2019). 
96 Own calculation. In detail, these are the companies 
Southern Province Cement Company, Saudi Cement, Eastern 
Cement, and Qassim Cement. For market shares, see AlJazira 
Capital, ed., Cement Dispatches for September 2018, October 
2018, http://www.aljaziracapital.com.sa/report_file/ess/SEC-
599.pdf (accessed 6 February 2019). 
97 See Aarthi Chandrasekaran, “Saudi Arabia in Invest-
ment Spree Mode”, Gulf News Business, 29 October 2017, 
https://gulfnews.com/business/markets/saudi-arabia-in-
investment-spree-mode-1.2115094 (accessed 9 May 2019). 
98 Faris Al-Sulayman, State Business Relations and the New 
Economic Agenda in Saudi Arabia, Issue Brief (Houston: Rice 
University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, 18 July 2018), 
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/96d3c6ac/ 
bi-brief-071818-cme-carnegie-london3.pdf (accessed 9 May 
2019). 
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from the lucrative sectors at a later stage. According-
ly, the IMF expressed fear in a recent analysis that 
“the increasing weight of the PIF could lead to a 
strengthening of the government’s role in the econo-
my and push back the private sector”.99 The PIF would 
thus continue the state’s dominance in the economy, 
which was characteristic of Saudi Arabia before 2015. 
The oil rents that accrued to the Saudi state in the 
1970s and early 1980s had fuelled state investment in 
almost all sectors of the economy and counteracted 
private-sector development. Though private economic 
activity had temporarily intensified when oil prices 
collapsed in the mid-1980s, the renewed rise in oil 
prices in the 2000s, the formation of speculative 
bubbles on the Arab capital markets (between 2004 
and 2006), and the global financial crisis of 2008 led 
the state to reappear as a superior economic actor, 
to the detriment of the private sector.100 However, 
 
99 IMF, ed., Saudi Arabia: 2018 Article IV Consultation 
(see note 7), 11. 
100 See Giacomo Luciani and Steffen Hertog, Has Arab Busi-
ness Ever Been, or Will It Be, a Player for Reform?, Arab Reform 
Initiative Policy Paper 1 (Paris: Arab Reform Initiative, Oc-
tober 2010), 4–8, http://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/ 
record/294629/files/ARI%20Policy_paper_Luciani_and_Hertog.
pdf; see also Steffen Hertog, “What Would the Saudi Econo-
my Have to Look Like to Be ‘Post-rentier’?”, in The Politics 
of Rentier States in the Gulf, POMEPS Studies 33 (Washington, 
D.C., 2019), 29–33, https://pomeps.org/2019/01/30/what-
would-the-saudi-economy-have-to-look-like-to-be-post-
rentier/ (both accessed 7 February 2019). 
there is a central difference between the state inter-
ventionism of past years and the economic expansion 
of the PIF: The interventionism of earlier times was 
supported by a large number of ministries, down-
stream authorities, and state-owned enterprises, 
above all Saudi Aramco. By bundling state economic 
activities under the PIF’s umbrella, it is now largely 
centralised. 
Mobilising Direct Investment, Knowledge 
and Technology Transfer 
Also in its role as a development fund, the PIF should 
attract capital and cutting-edge technology to the king-
dom through direct investment in foreign companies 
and “strategic partnerships” with other international 
investment funds. In addition, the SWF launched an 
international investor conference, the “Future Invest-
ment Initiative”, which has been held annually in 
Riyadh since 2017.101 Following the example of the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, the PIF is using this 
event to create a platform where decision-makers 
from politics and business can discuss global eco-
nomic trends and, at the same time, gain an impres-
 
101 “Saudi PIF to Host Top ‘Future Investment Initiative’ 
Forum”, Al Arabiya, 18 September 2017, https://english. 
alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2017/09/18/Saudi-PIF-to-
host-top-Future-Investment-Initiative-forum.html (accessed 
20 February 2019). 
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sion of the attractiveness of the kingdom as an invest-
ment location. 
According to the PIF’s programme, the share of 
international assets in total assets under management 
should increase from 5 per cent (2017) to 25 per cent 
in 2020.102 This target could actually be achieved. 
Between 2015 and 2019, the fund has built up an ex-
tensive portfolio of international investments in 
various business sectors, ranging from agriculture 
and food to real estate and energy (see the overview 
of the largest investments in the Appendix, p. 30ff.). 
Until today, the PIF may have invested well over $45 
billion abroad103 – together with committed and 
planned investments this amount could reach up to 
$100 billion. For this purpose, the SWF has entered 
into partnerships with private and state-owned invest-
ment companies, including the US asset manager 
Blackstone, the Japanese SoftBank Group, and the 
state-owned Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). 
In fact, thanks to the PIF’s foreign investments, 
new companies have emerged in Saudi Arabia, such 
as the Saudi-Korean joint venture PECSA, founded 
in 2015 with the aim to bring Korean construction 
know-how to the kingdom.104 However, it is more 
than questionable whether such joint ventures and 
 
102 See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Public Investment Fund 
Program (2018–2020) (see note 24), 14. 
103 Saeed Azhar, Nafisa Eltahir and Tuqa Khalid, “Factbox: 
Saudi Sovereign Fund’s Strategy in Focus”, Reuters, 28 June 
2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-pif-
investment-factbox/factbox-saudi-sovereign-funds-strategy- 
in-focus-idUSKCN1TT0ON. 
104 PECSA was established as a result of the PIF’s acqui-
sition of a $1 billion stake in the Korean design and con-
struction company POSCO Engineering & Construction, 
see “POSCO E&C Announces Active Involvement in Saudi 
Vision 2030”, Posco Newsroom (online), 30 June 2016, https:// 
newsroom.posco.com/en/posco-ec-announces-active-
involvement-saudi-vision-2030/. The PIF subsidiary SAMI’s 
planned acquisition of a stake in South African Rheinmetall 
Denel Munition – a joint venture between German Rhein-
metall and South African defence company Denel – is also 
in line with this strategy. At the end of 2018, the PIF appar-
ently tried to buy up the South African share in a joint ven-
ture between Denel and Rheinmetall in order to strengthen 
its own defence industry, see Joe Bavier and Alexander 
Winning, “Exclusive: Saudi Makes $1 Billion Bid for Partner-
ship with South Africa Defense Group Denel”, Reuters, 8 No-
vember 2018, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-safrica-
arms-exclusive/exclusive-saudi-makes-1-billion-bid-for-
partnership-with-south-africa-defense-group-denel-idUSKCN 
1ND14Q (both accessed 7 February 2019). 
the aggressive marketing strategy in the form of the 
Future Investment Initiative can attract SAR 20 bil-
lion ($5.3 billion) of FDI to the kingdom between 2018 
and 2020, as announced in the PIF’s programme.105 
Ultimately, the decisive factor for the inflow of FDI is 
not the investment policy of the SWF, but rather the 
general investment climate in Saudi Arabia, which 
international investors have rated as being less than 
positive in recent years. In the World Bank’s Ease of 
Doing Business Ranking, the kingdom has tended to 
deteriorate by international standards since 2016: In 
2019, it ranked 92nd (2016: 83rd), by far the worst 
position in the G20 group of countries to which it 
belongs.106 The inflow of FDI is correspondingly low, 
having slumped 80 per cent to $1.4 billion between 
2016 and 2017.107 In 2018, the country was able to 
record more FDI, with $3.5 billion.108 Compared 
to other economies with similarly high GDPs, how-
ever, the inflow is at an extremely low level.109 
The expansion of the PIF is leading to 
a remarkable centralisation of Saudi 
Arabia’s foreign investment and arms 
procurement activities. 
In any case, the expansion of the PIF is leading to 
a remarkable centralisation of Saudi Arabia’s foreign 
 
105 See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Public Investment Fund 
Program (2018–2020) (see note 24), 14. 
106 See World Bank, “Rankings & Ease of Doing Business 
Score”, 2019, http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings 
(accessed 9 May 2019). 
107 Dominic Dudley, “Saudi Arabia Suffers Shock Collapse 
in Inward Investment”, Forbes, 7 June 2018, http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/06/07/saudi-arabia-
shock-collapse-investment/#62478c536e60 (accessed 7 Feb-
ruary 2019); United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment, World Investment Report 2018 (Geneva, June 2018), 
190f., https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en. 
pdf (accessed 9 May 2019). 
108 Marwa Rashad and Stephen Kalin, “Foreign Investment 
in Saudi Arabia More than Doubled in 2018: Minister”, 
Reuters, 19 December 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-saudi-budget-energy-industry/foreign-investment-in-saudi-
arabia-more-than-doubled-in-2018-minister-idUSKBN1OI0QU 
(accessed 9 May 2019). 
109 In the first three quarters of 2018, Turkey, for example, 
already had an inflow of more than $8 billion, see Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, Foreign 
Direct Investment Statistics: Data, Analysis and Forecasts, 16 Janu-
ary 2019, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/statistics.htm 
(accessed 9 May 2019). 
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investment activity. Whereas in the past a number of 
ministries and other state institutions maintained 
their own funds for foreign investments whose activ-
ities were not coordinated by the government,110 the 
PIF is now the kingdom’s sole state investor inter-
nationally. Investments can thus be much more 
focussed on individual markets or industries. This 
is particularly evident in the SoftBank Vision Fund, 
which the Japanese SoftBank Group launched in 
2017, and in which the PIF effectively holds a con-
trolling majority of $45 billion. Through this invest-
ment, the SWF became the largest single investor in 
the US startup scene by October 2018.111 Another 
example is the $20 billion investment in the infra-
structure fund of the Blackstone Group, providing 
the PIF considerable weight in infrastructure devel-
opment projects in the United States. 
In addition, the fund’s task to develop international 
strategic partnerships has given it a significant influ-
ence in the awarding of contracts to foreign compa-
nies. This is particularly evident in the defence sector. 
The PIF is indirectly involved in Saudi defence pro-
curement through the SAMI holding company. 
Whereas in the past, procurement was decentralised 
and organised by the individual security bodies (Min-
 
110 Kristin Smith Diwan estimated the number of govern-
ment agencies with investment activity abroad in 2009 at 
between 50 and 60, see Kristin Smith Diwan, “Sovereign 
Dilemmas: Saudi Arabia and Sovereign Wealth Funds”, 
Geopolitics 14, no. 2 (2009): 354. 
111 Eliot Brown and Greg Bensinger, “Saudi Money Flows 
into Silicon Valley – and with It Qualms”, The Wall Street 
Journal, 16 October 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-
backlash-threatens-u-s-startups-1539707574 (accessed 7 Feb-
ruary 2019). 
istry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior, or Ministry 
for the National Guard), in 2017 it was centralised 
under the umbrella of a new authority: the General 
Authority for Military Industries. This authority 
organises arms procurement in principle, but SAMI 
seems to be highly involved in procurement decision-
making because of its mandate to establish a national 
arms industry (see Figure 3).112 
Whether this centralisation of foreign investment 
and public procurement really pays off for the king-
dom is questionable. In the past, the welfare loss 
suffered by the Saudi state was caused less by a lack 
of centralisation than by an intermeshing of public 
and private interests in investment decisions and 
public procurement.113 The absence of public control 
and the associated lack of transparency of the PIF 
does nothing to counteract this problem. 
 
112 See “GAMI, SAMI: The New Defence Procurement Deci-
sion-makers”, Intelligence Online, 11 April 2018, http://www. 
intelligenceonline.com/international-dealmaking/2018/ 
04/11/gami-sami-the-new-defence-procurement-decision-
makers,108306596-art (accessed 22 May 2019). 
113 See among others Diwan, “Sovereign Dilemmas” 
(see note 110), 354. 
Figure 3 
 
 
 Effects on Domestic Power Relations 
 SWP Berlin 
 A Sovereign Wealth Fund for the Prince 
 July 2019 
 23 
The previous analysis shows that the expansion of the 
PIF seems hardly suitable for achieving the economic 
goals set by the Saudi government. Rather, it shows 
that through the restructuring, the SWF gets access 
to a significant share of public revenues and takes a 
dominant position in much of the kingdom’s econo-
my. Against the background of more recent research 
about SWFs, this result is by no means surprising.114 
For a long time, SWFs have been analysed under the 
general assumption that the state, as the owner, tries 
to assert its economic interests or those of the domes-
tic economy through the SWF. Recent work, however, 
has placed more emphasis on the interests of the 
“ruling elites”.115 The basic assumption is that ruling 
elites have discovered SWFs as an instrument “to 
secure their domestic political dominance against 
both internal and external threats”.116 By controlling 
an SWF, political leaders can increase their “autono-
my”, both vis-à-vis their own population as well as 
other countries. Against this background, the ques-
tion arises as to what effects the expansion of the PIF 
will have on Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman’s 
position of power within the kingdom and on his 
room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. 
 
114 For an overview, see Kyle Hatton and Katharina Pistor, 
“Maximizing Autonomy in the Shadow of Great Powers: 
The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds”, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 50, no. 1 (2012): 4ff. 
115 Ibid., see also Sara Bazoobandi and Jeffrey B. Nugent, 
Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Oil Exporting 
Countries of the Arab Region and Especially the Gulf, Working 
Paper no. 1143 (Gizeh: Economic Research Forum, October 
2017), https://erf.org.eg/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/1143.pdf 
(accessed 24 January 2019); Artur Grigoryan, “The Ruling 
Bargain: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Elite-dominated Socie-
ties”, Economic of Governance 17, no. 2 (Mai 2016): 165–84. 
116 Hatton and Pistor, “Maximizing Autonomy” (see note 
114), 13ff. 
Effects on Domestic Power Relations 
In Saudi Arabia itself, the upgrading of the PIF pro-
motes a centralisation and concentration of power. 
Prior to 2015, Saudi Arabia’s ruling system was char-
acterised by the existence of different centres of pow-
er, controlled by different factions within the ruling 
family.117 Supplied by the country’s oil rents, these 
centres of power, in turn, maintained patronage net-
works in the state apparatus and in the economy. 
This system of formal and informal rent-based rela-
tions can be described as “segmented clientelism”.118 
In addition to the official institutions, the Saudi state 
was thus pervaded by downright parallel structures, 
each with a distinct life of its own.119 On the one 
hand, this system enabled the political integration 
of a large number of actors, and thus reduced the 
danger of resistance to the royal court. On the other 
hand, it encouraged the emergence of “bureaucratic 
fiefdoms”, which ultimately also acted as veto players, 
for example in implementing economic reforms.120 
 
117 See, e.g., Madawi Al-Rasheed, “Circles of Power. Royals 
and Society in Saudi Arabia”, in Saudi Arabia in the Balance – 
Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, ed. Paul Aarts and 
Gerd Nonneman (New York, 2006), 189ff.; Iris Glosemeyer, 
“Saudi Arabia: Dynamism Uncovered”, in Arab Elites. Negotiat-
ing the Politics of Change, ed. Volker Perthes (Boulder, 2004), 
148ff. 
118 See also the conceptual work of Steffen Hertog, in par-
ticular “Segmented Clientelism: The Political Economy of 
Saudi Economic Reform Efforts”, in Saudi Arabia in the Bal-
ance, ed. Aarts and Nonneman (see note 117), 111–43. 
119 Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats. Oil and 
the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca, 2010), in particular 84ff. 
120 Ibid., 117. 
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The patron–client relationships in 
Saudi Arabia are likely to become 
more centralised in the future. 
The bundling of property rights and control powers 
in the form of the PIF changes this multipolar clien-
tele system in favour of the crown prince. Through 
the fund, Muhammad Bin Salman gets direct access to 
a considerable part of the state’s financial resources 
and can distribute them according to his preferences, 
be it in the form of transfer payments to groups of 
strategic importance for the government – for exam-
ple in the security apparatus – or targeted invest-
ments that promote personal dependencies on the 
crown prince in the business community. Moreover, 
through the SWF, Bin Salman gains a direct and great 
influence on the development of the economy that 
no member of the ruling family has had in the past. 
The patron–client relationships in Saudi Arabia are 
therefore likely to become even more centralised in 
the future and run towards one person, namely Bin 
Salman. His position of power vis-à-vis other influ-
ential members of the ruling Saud family, but also 
members of the Saudi business elite, will be massively 
strengthened. 
The pending transfer of Saudi Aramco ownership 
rights to the SWF is likely to be the key milestone in 
power centralisation: Following the full nationalisa-
tion of Aramco in 1980, the company was run by 
technocrats instead of members of the ruling family. 
In this way, it was ensured that no member or faction 
of the Saud family had exclusive access to the coun-
try’s oil wealth.121 The “Saudisation” of Saudi Aram-
co’s management, which began in 1988 – during 
which Western managers were replaced by Saudi 
citizens – did not change this, nor did the formal 
subordination of the company to the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources.122 The assignment 
of the company to the PIF’s sphere of competence 
 
121 Apparently also for this reason, the position of Minis-
ter of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and the leadership 
of Aramco itself has always been occupied by technocrats, 
see Stenslie, Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia (see note 32), 32 
and 68; see also Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureau-
crats (see note 119), 28. 
122 Ultimately, the ministry, whose leadership was also 
never occupied by members of the ruling family, was con-
trolled more by Aramco than it could influence the manage-
ment of the oil company itself, see Ellen R. Wald, Saudi Inc. 
The Arabian Kingdom’s Pursuit of Profit and Power (New York, 
2018), in particular 240ff. 
would, in fact, break with this principle. In particu-
lar, the described direct injection of the company’s 
dividend payment into the PIF’s budget would greatly 
strengthen the crown prince’s access to the state’s 
resources, and thus the establishment of a patronage 
system that can be described as “centralised clien-
telism”. 
Effects on the Kingdom’s Foreign Policy 
The expansion of the PIF counteracts the waning 
importance of the kingdom’s existing foreign policy 
instruments. So far, the Saudi leadership has at-
tempted to exert foreign policy influence by playing 
off the country’s position as the world’s largest oil 
exporter and, with a view to US policy, buying Ameri-
can government bonds.123 In recent years, however, 
it has become clear that Riyadh has not been able to 
assert its interests as hoped, either through its oil 
policy or through the accumulation of US govern-
 
123 The 1973 oil embargo in the course of the war between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours, which was intended to per-
suade Western states to provide their support for Israel, was 
an example of the foreign policy instrumentalisation of oil 
policy. But even in later years, Saudi decision-makers threat-
ened to throttle oil production in order to achieve foreign 
policy goals, most recently in response to international criti-
cism of the murder of the Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi, 
see “Saudi Oil Threat in Khashoggi Disappearance Seen As a 
Bluff”, Foreign Policy, 15 October 2018, https://foreignpolicy. 
com/2018/10/15/saudi-oil-threat-jamal-khashoggi-seen-as-a-
bluff/ (accessed 9 May 2019). The purchase of US government 
bonds has again been used since the 1970s to tie the king-
dom as closely as possible to the United States. In contrast to 
other Gulf monarchs, which relied on their SWFs to increase 
the diversification of their foreign investments, Saudi Arabia 
successively expanded its portfolio of US government bonds 
and for this reason also refrained from setting up its own 
SWF. On occasion, Riyadh also tried to use its holdings of US 
government bonds as leverage to exert aggressive pressure 
on Washington, most recently in 2016 in the wake of the 
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. In order to pre-
vent the passage of the law, which opens the way for civil 
actions against Saudi Arabia in connection with the attacks 
of 11 September 2001, the royal family threatened to sell the 
government bonds without any cover, see Mark Mazzetti, 
“Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout if Congress Passes 
9/11 Bill”, New York Times, 15 April 2016, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2016/04/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-warns-
ofeconomic-fallout-if-congress-passes-9-11-bill.html (accessed 
9 May 2019). 
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ment bonds. The United States has made itself largely 
independent of oil imports through an increase in 
shale oil and gas production, which, according to gov-
ernment representatives, has also had an impact on 
its scope for foreign policy action, especially in the 
Middle East.124 In addition, the kingdom would dam-
age itself in the medium and long term through po-
litically motivated oil price increases, if such in-
creases can be brought about at all in the short term 
by cuts in production, which some experts doubt.125 
This would result in revenue losses due to falling oil 
demand, especially from East Asia, the loss of market 
share to other producers, and an acceleration in the 
expansion of alternative energies.126 Moreover, with 
regard to US government bonds, Saudi Arabia’s 
holdings have lost considerable international impor-
tance, not least because of the massive purchases by 
China.127 Market observers therefore assume that a 
disposal of government bonds would have hardly any 
impact on market activity, and thus on the price of 
the bonds.128 Should a Saudi “selloff” of government 
bonds and other US dollar-denominated assets never-
theless have negative consequences for the US cur-
 
124 See Ed Crooks, “US Official Says Shale Boom Has 
Fuelled Support for Israel”, Financial Times, 28 March 2019, 
https://www.ft.com/content/68cc8a60-5027-11e9-9c76-
bf4a0ce37d49 (accessed 11 April 2019). 
125 One argument against this is that OPEC as a whole has 
lost much of its influence on the development of oil prices 
and that Russia and the United States now play a stronger 
role as producers, see Kenneth Rapoza, “Saudi’s Admit, Oil 
Prices No Longer in OPEC’s Control”, Forbes, 30 May 2017, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/05/30/saudis-
admit-oil-prices-no-longer-in-opecs-control/#3121bd953b09 
(accessed 20 February 2019). 
126 See Natasha Turak, “Saudi Arabia Could Hike Oil Prices 
over the Khashoggi Case. Here’s Why It Would Backfire”, 
CNBC, 16 October 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/16/ 
saudi-arabia-could-spike-oil-prices-over-journalist-case--but-it-
would-backfire.html (accessed 20 February 2019). 
127 Directly, the kingdom holds US treasury securities 
worth around $170 billion, whereas the People’s Republic of 
China holds more than $1.1 trillion. However, these figures 
do not include government bonds held via offshore financial 
centres, see Department of the Treasury and Federal Reserve 
Board, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, 15 April 
2019, http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt (accessed 
9 May 2019). 
128 See Tim Worstall, “Saudi Arabia’s Threat to Sell Off 
$750 Billion of US Assets over 9/11 Bill Is Pretty Empty 
Really”, Forbes, 17 April 2016, http://bit.ly/30JkS31 (accessed 
11 April 2019). 
rency, this would also be detrimental to the kingdom 
itself, as it has pegged its own currency to the US dol-
lar and therefore had to devalue it proportionately 
against other currencies.129 
Through the SWF, Bin Salman could 
“buy” international support for his 
political goals. 
Against this backdrop, the abovementioned in-
crease in Saudi foreign investment and its bundling 
under the PIF’s umbrella, but also the centralisation 
of public procurement – in the defence sector, for 
example – could serve to create a new foreign policy 
lever. Through the SWF, Bin Salman could “buy” 
international support for his political goals. The insti-
tutional cooperation of the PIF with the Russian SWF 
RDIF and the $2.5 billion trilateral partnership be-
tween the PIF, the RDIF, and the Chinese SWF China 
Investment Corporation bears witness to the fact that 
this is one of the functions associated with the 
fund.130 These deals are linked to an obvious political 
rapprochement between the three governments in-
volved.131 
The PIF’s investments in foreign companies could 
also be used by the crown prince as a foreign policy 
tool. This could play out especially in the case of the 
United States. Through the massive investment of 
venture capital via the SoftBank Vision Fund de-
 
129 See Binyamin Appelbaum, “Saudi Threat to Sell U.S. 
Assets Could Hurt, but Mostly the Saudis”, New York Times, 
19 April 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/business/ 
international/saudi-threat-to-sell-us-assetscould-hurt-but-
mostly-the-saudis.html (accessed 11 April 2019). 
130 “Russian Fund, Saudi Arabia to Invest in One of 
Russia’s Top Logistics Operators”, TASS, 14 June 2018, http:// 
tass.com/economy/1009564; Polina Devitt, “UPDATE 1-Rus-
sian Sovereign Wealth Fund Attracts Saudi Partner to Its 
Fund with China”, Reuters, 25 October 2018, http://www. 
reuters.com/article/saudi-investment-russia-china/update-1-
russian-sovereign-wealth-fund-attracts-saudi-partner-to-its-
fund-with-china-idUSL8N1X58C6; Michael B. Greenwald, 
“The Saudi Economy Moves Closer to Russia and China”, 
The National Interest, 5 December 2018, https://nationalinter 
est.org/feature/saudi-economy-moves-closer-russia-and-china-
37937 (all accessed 7 February 2019). 
131 Henry Foy, “Russia-Saudi Arabia Rapprochement Re-
shapes More Than the Oil Market”, Financial Times, 30 Octo-
ber 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/aa39b74c-4f0c-11e8-
ac41-759eee1efb74; “China Supports Saudi Arabia in Eco-
nomic and Social Change: Xi”, Reuters, 30 November 2018, 
https://reut.rs/30ILfGw (all accessed 7 February 2019). 
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scribed above, the PIF has a considerable influence on 
the development of the startup scene in the United 
States. According to analysts, in the event of a capital 
withdrawal, the fund could cause massive damage to 
the entire venture capital market.132 Similarly, the 
PIF’s investments in US infrastructure – a sector that 
is a source of many jobs and a focal point of the cur-
rent US administration’s economic policy – are likely 
to have similar political relevance. In addition, the 
PIF’s main business partner in that sector, the Black-
stone Group, is backed by Stephen Schwarzman, one 
of the most politically influential business leaders in 
the United States.133 Finally, the PIF has considerable 
influence through SAMI on Saudi arms procurements, 
which are of central importance for the US arms in-
dustry: Between 2013 and 2017, 18 per cent of US 
arms exports went to the kingdom, making it by far 
the largest customer of the US defence industry.134 
 
132 For the significance of the Vision Fund for Silicon 
Valley’s startup industry, see among others Noah Kulwin, 
“Why Silicon Valley Finds It Hard to Say No to Saudi Arabian 
Dollars”, Intelligencer, 24 October 2018, http://nymag.com/ 
intelligencer/2018/10/silicon-valley-cant-quit-saudi-arabia-
even-after-khashoggi.html. Bin Salman seems to be well 
aware of the importance of Saudi investment in the Vision 
Fund. In an interview, he made it unmistakably clear: “We 
are the creators of the SoftBank Vision Fund … Without the 
PIF, there will be no SoftBank Vision Fund”, quoted in Tim 
Culpan, “Here’s How Saudi Cash Could Bring on the Global 
VC Crash”, Bloomberg, 24 October 2018, https://www. 
bloombergquint.com/opinion/balking-at-saudi-cash-after-
khashoggi-could-end-the-vc-party (both accessed 9 May 2019). 
133 See John Blau, “The New Masters of the Universe: 
America’s Landlord”, Handelsblatt Today, 21 November 2016, 
https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/finance/stephen-
schwarzman-the-new-masters-of-the-universe-americas-
landlord/23542738.html (accessed 3 February 2019). The 
Washington Post described Schwarzman 2018 as “Trump’s 
China Whisperer”, an allusion to the billionaire’s great 
influence on the China policy of the current US adminis-
tration. (Michael Kranish, “Billionaire Ally Endeavors to Keep 
Trump Close to China”, The Washington Post, 13 March 2018). 
The deal between the PIF and the Blackstone Group was 
announced during Trump’s state visit to Saudi Arabia in May 
2017, Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Ben Protess and Michael 
Corkery, “The Benefits of Standing by the President”, New 
York Times, 19 August 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
08/19/business/the-benefits-of-standing-by-the-president.html 
(accessed 3 February 2019). 
134 See Pieter D. Wezeman et al., Trends in International 
Arms Transfers, 2017 (Solna: Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, March 2018), 2, http://www.sipri.org/sites/ 
That this foreign policy lever is powerful became 
clear not least in the context of the murder of Saudi 
dissident Jamal Khashoggi. President Donald Trump 
openly rejected far-reaching sanctions against Saudi 
Arabia by pointing out its significance for the Ameri-
can economy.135 The US administration as well as 
other countries refrained from blaming the crown 
prince in particular. 
 
 
default/files/2018-03/fssipri_at2017_0.pdf (accessed 7 Feb-
ruary 2019). 
135 Karen DeYoung, “For Trump, the Relationship with 
Saudi Arabia Is All about Money”, The Washington Post, 19 No-
vember 2018, https://wapo.st/30GI7ek (accessed 7 February 
2019). 
 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 SWP Berlin 
 A Sovereign Wealth Fund for the Prince 
 July 2019 
 27 
Contrary to what is stated in Vision 2030, the new 
Saudi SWF, the PIF, serves less as a growth engine for 
the kingdom than as a central steering instrument for 
Crown Prince Bin Salman, who is consolidating and 
securing his own political power for the long term. 
Thus, the expansion of the SWF, which has been con-
ducted in the shortest possible time, as well as its 
institutional redesign must be seen as prerequisites 
for the implementation of other measures announced 
in Vision 2030: Through the PIF, Bin Salman can 
carry out the planned reforms – at least in part – 
without losing political control. Exemplary here is the 
plan to allow more transparency, increase account-
ability, and generally establish good governance 
around public finances. These reforms could be car-
ried out with regard to the formal public budget. The 
first signs of this are already visible: The implementa-
tion of the Fiscal Balance programme, for example, 
has significantly improved public access to informa-
tion on state finances.136 However, the PIF itself is 
exempt from these reforms. Bin Salman could there-
fore ostensibly meet international demands, such as 
those of the IMF, and adapt the “official” government 
revenue and expenditure system more closely to in-
ternational standards – as announced in Vision 2030 
– and at the same time keep direct control over a 
large portion of public revenues as if it were his pri-
vate fortune. 
Another example is the support of private-sector 
development, also mentioned in Vision 2030. In fact, 
Bin Salman could, for example, significantly increase 
the share of the private sector formally in Saudi 
Arabia’s economic output through the (partial) pri-
vatisation of public enterprises, without having to 
fear that this sector will become economically inde-
pendent of the centre of political power. Through the 
heavy economic involvement of the PIF, the entre-
 
136 See Moshashai et al., “Saudi Arabia Plans for Its Eco-
nomic Future” (see note 6), 12ff. 
preneurial camp remains dependent on Bin Salman 
and will hardly be able to play any political role in 
the future. 
Above all, however, the PIF offers the crown prince 
reinsurance in the event that the announced goals of 
Vision 2030 should fail to materialise. If the kingdom 
is unable to reduce its dependency on oil and channel 
foreign investments into productive areas, there will 
be massive budget cuts in the medium and long term 
and a further rise in the already high unemployment 
rate. With the SWF, Bin Salman has an instrument at 
his disposal to counter social tensions through trans-
fer payments to groups that are strategically impor-
tant for the government. Personal loyalty relations, 
for example with members of the security organs, 
could thus be maintained, even in an economic 
situation in which there is no alternative to a com-
prehensive austerity policy. Through the PIF’s stra-
tegic investments abroad, the crown prince could also 
hope for international support, even in a situation 
where domestic political pressure on the royal court 
is growing. 
However, the development of the PIF is not yet 
complete. For example, despite its remarkable expan-
sion over the past four years, the SWF has by no 
means achieved its stated goal of becoming the “pre-
ferred and most impactful partner globally”.137 At the 
end of 2018 in particular, the fund’s development 
suffered a severe setback. The murder of Saudi dis-
sident Jamal Khashoggi has damaged Saudi Arabia’s 
image, especially in the United States and Europe. 
Accordingly, investors have also distanced themselves 
from the Saudi SWF. This became evident at the 
second Future Investment Initiative Conference in 
Riyadh, held three weeks after Khashoggi’s death. 
Numerous high-ranking international business repre-
sentatives cancelled their participation apparently for 
 
137 See Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Public Investment Fund 
Program (2018–2020) (see note 24), 14. 
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fear of damaging their companies’ image. Some inves-
tors even cancelled their existing business relation-
ships with the PIF.138 However, this setback is unlikely 
to slow the expansion of the PIF in the long term. 
Multinational companies such as Siemens declared 
their willingness to continue doing business with 
Saudi Arabia shortly after the murder. 
However, a much greater hurdle to the further 
development of the SWF has arisen within the king-
dom. The extent of the resistance to the expansion of 
the PIF can hardly be assessed from the outside. The 
fact that Saudi Aramco’s planned IPO has been post-
poned and the ownership of the company has not yet 
been transferred to the PIF can, however, be seen as 
an indication of such resistance. Should Saudi Aram-
co’s IPO and the associated transfer of ownership 
rights to the PIF not take place in 2020/21, the fund 
will hardly be able to achieve the specified growth 
targets – this would not only dampen the PIF itself, 
but also Muhammad Bin Salman’s efforts to consoli-
date his power. From today’s perspective, however, it 
is hardly conceivable that critics of the expansion of 
the PIF could prevail in the kingdom. 
For Germany and its European partners, the ex-
pansion of the PIF poses two challenges: On the one 
hand, the example of the SWF makes it abundantly 
clear how closely economic and political develop-
ments in Saudi Arabia are linked. In light of Bin 
Salman’s aggressive regional policy, there is an in-
tense debate in Germany and Europe as to whether – 
and to what extent – arms exports to the kingdom 
are politically justifiable, whereas economic coopera-
tion in other areas has so far been regarded as com-
pletely harmless. However, the instrumentalisation 
of the PIF as the crown prince’s tool of political power 
described above may well give cooperation with the 
SWF itself or with companies under its control a po-
litical dimension that should not be ignored. 
On the other hand, there is the question of how 
European governments should react to investments 
by the PIF in Europe. In contrast to the SWFs of other 
Gulf monarchies, above all the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority, the Kuwait Investment Authority, and the 
Qatar Investment Authority – which, as return-ori-
ented investors, have built up stakes in large Euro-
pean companies over decades – the PIF currently has 
 
138 “Khashoggi Case Drives Growing Exodus from Saudi 
Business Ventures”, Financial Times, 12 October 2018, https:// 
www.ft.com/content/507f2c24-cd0a-11e8-b276-b9069bde0956 
(accessed 1 March 2019). 
a minimal presence in Europe. In Germany, for exam-
ple, only a minority stake in the logistics company 
Hapag-Lloyd is known to the public. However, the 
Vision Fund of the Japanese SoftBank Group, which 
is largely financed by the PIF, has made significant 
investments in German technology companies since 
2018.139 Should the PIF expand its investment activ-
ities in Europe, a political impact assessment could 
become necessary in view of the close link between 
the fund and the Saudi government. An assessment 
would have to be made as to whether the PIF exclu-
sively acts as a profit-seeking investor or whether it 
pursues a foreign policy agenda. In the latter case, 
European decision-makers would have to consider 
very carefully whether such an investment is actually 
in the political interest of the recipient country, simi-
lar to the way they deal with SWFs and state-owned 
enterprises from China and Russia.140 
 
139 These include the German startups Auto1 Group and 
GetYourGuide as well as the DAX-listed company Wirecard, 
see Ingrid Lunden, “GetYourGuide Picks up $484M, Passes 
25M Tickets Sold through Its Tourism Activity App”, 
TechCrunch, 15 May 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/05/16/ 
getyourguide-picks-up-484m-passes-25m-tickets-sold-
through-its-tourism-activity-app/ (accessed 16 May 2019). 
140 In this context, it is also necessary to consider a 
fundamental new regulation in dealing with foreign SWFs. 
For an introduction to this topic, see Alexander Fink and 
Kalle Kappner, “Ausländische Staatsfonds: Gefährliche Inves-
toren?”, Institute for Research in Economic and Fiscal Issues, 2 Feb-
ruary 2018, https://de.irefeurope.org/Diskussionsbeitrage/ 
Artikel/Auslandische-Staatsfonds-Gefahrliche-Investoren 
(accessed 9 May 2019). 
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Abbreviations 
BoD Board of Directors 
CEDA Council of Economic and Development Affairs 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
PIF Public Investment Fund 
RDIF Russian Direct Investment Fund 
RSIF Russia-Saudi Investment Fund 
SABIC Saudi Basic Industries Corporation 
SAMA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
SAMI Saudi Arabian Military Industries 
SAR Saudi Riyal 
SEVEN Saudi Entertainment Ventures Company 
SME Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
SWF Sovereign Wealth Fund 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
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Table 1 
Foreign investments (committed or realised) by the PIF or subsidiaries 2015–2019 
PIF / subsidiary 
investment or 
commitment 
 
 
Month and Year 
 
 
Investment 
 
 
Sector 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Source 
$1.08–1.36 bn February 2015 POSCO (38% share) Steel South Korea 1&10 
$10 bn July 2015 (agree-
ment signed) 
May 2017  
(RSIF start) 
Nine “joint investments” with 
Russian Direct Investment 
Fund/Establishment of Russia-
Saudi Investment Fund (RSIF) 
Infrastructure & 
agriculture  
Russia 1&11 
$3 bn July 2015 (final 
negotiation phase) 
Coface (investment) Export finance/ 
Credit insurer 
France 1&13 
$2 bn October 2015 French private fonds Renewable energies 
& SMEs 
n.a. 1&12 
<$16 bn 
(distribution n.a.) 
April 2016 Framework agreement with 
Egypt for investment funds 
n.a. n.a. 1 
$3.5 bn June 2016 Uber (5% share) Tech/Startup US 1 
$775.25 m July 2016 Hapag-Lloyd (10.1% share) Shipping industry Germany 1&14 
$500 m November 2016 noon.com (investment) Tech/Startup UAE 1&15 
$2 bn November 2016 Adeptio (50% share) Foodstuffs UAE/Kuwait 1&16 
$45 bn 
(5 years) 
May 2017 SoftBank Group “Vision Fund” 
and “Vision Fund 2” (total 
volume $93 bn, managed by 
SoftBank). 
Individual investments: 
Tech Japan 1 
 $9.0 bn   Uber (largest shareholder) Tech/Startup US 3 
 $8.3 bn   ARM Holdings (25%) Tech UK 3 
 $8.2 bn   Nvidia Tech (chips) US 3 
 $4.4 bn   WeWork Startup US 3 
 $3.2 bn   GM Cruise Mobility US 3 
 $1.0 bn   Roivant Biopharma US 3 
 $500 bn   Improbable Tech/Entertainment UK 3 
 $500 bn   DoorDash Startup/Food delivery USA 3 
 $460 bn   Auto1 Online shop Germany 3 
 $300 bn   Slack Tech/Startup US 3 
 $284 bn May 2019  GetYourGuide Tech/Startup Germany 17 
 $800 bn May 2019  Greensill Capital Finance UK 17 
 
 Appendix 
 SWP Berlin 
 A Sovereign Wealth Fund for the Prince 
 July 2019 
 31 
Table 1 (continued) 
Foreign investments (committed or realised) by the PIF or subsidiaries 2015–2019 
PIF / subsidiary 
investment or 
commitment 
 
 
Month and Year 
 
 
Investment 
 
 
Sector 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Source 
  SoftBank Group “Vision Fund” 
and “Vision Fund 2”. 
Individual investments (cont.): 
   
 $1.2 bn May 2019  Cruise Mobility USA 17 
 $1 bn May 2019  Rappi Tech/Startup Columbia 17 
$20 bn May 2017 Blackstone (MoU) Infrastructure US 1&18 
n.a. December 2017 AMC Entertainment Holdings 
(MoU) 
Films US 1&19 
$50 m 2018 TriLinc Global Impact Fund All sectors US 5 
$200 m March 2018 Penske Media Corporation Media US 6 
$461 m March 2018 Magic Leap (investment) Tech/Startup  
(augmented reality) 
US 1 
n.a. April 2018 Six Flags 
(agreement) 
Entertainment US/Saudi 
Arabia 
1 
$100 m June 2018 Tushino Airfield Develop-
ment/Project (with RDIF) 
Infrastructure Russia 8 
$300 m July 2018 Arcelor Mittal Tubular 
Products Jubail (AMTPJ) 
(40% share) 
Steel Luxem-
bourg/UK 
4 
$5.33 bn May 2018 AccorInvest 
(57.8% share) 
Hotel and 
real estate 
France 1 
$2 bn August 2018 Tesla (5% share) Mobility US 1&9 
$1 bn September 2018 Lucid Motors (investment) Mobility US 1 
n.a. September 2018 Mriya Agro Holding 
(takeover by Saudi Agricul-
tural and Livestock Investment 
Company [SALIC]) 
Agro-products Ukraine 7 
 
The selection does not claim to be exhaustive. 
n.a. = not available; MoU = memorandum of understanding. 
Sources: See next page. 
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Sources to Table 1 
1 https://www.reuters.com/article/saudi-politics-fund-
investment/factbox-saudi-sovereign-funds-investments-abroad-
idUKL8N1WV4HI 
2 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-19/ 
aramco-sabic-deal-would-funnel-billions-to-saudi-sovereign-
fund 
3 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/oct/20/saudi-
arabia-business-titans-fight-shy-trillion-dollar-mohammed-bin-
salman-jamal-khashoggi 
4 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-04/ saudi-
fund-said-to-consider-boosting-stake-in-arcelormittal-jv 
5 https://www.barrons.com/articles/jamal-khashoggi-case-puts-
financial-ties-to-saudi-arabia-under-strain-1539994250 
6 https://gulfbusiness.com/saudis-pif-acquires-stake-us-media-
business-200m/ 
7 http://noozz.com/saudi-pifs-unit-acquires-ukrainian-mriya-
agro-holding/ 
8 https://rdif.ru/Eng_fullNews/3334/ 
9 https://www.ft.com/content/ca35d8fa-9bba-11e8-9702-
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